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This paper reviews a series of paradoxes that exist in the experimental economics 
literature. These paradoxes are instances in which otherwise accurate models of markets 
and social choice processes fail to capture the data of experiments. A loosely developed
theory called The Discovered Preference Hypdthesis is advanced in the paper as an 
explanation. Behavior seems to go through stages of rationality that begin with a type of 
myopia when faced with unfamiliar tasks. With incentives and practice, which might
take the form of repeated decisions in the experimental work, (but might include play,
banter, discussions with others, stages of commitment, etc.) the myopia gives way to 
what appears to be a. stage of more considered choices that reflect stable attitudes or 
preferences (as opposed to the labile attitudes identified by psychologists). Social
institutions are seen as playing a role in the attainment of a third stage of rationality in
which individual dei::isions incorporate the rationality of others, or the lack of it, in their 
own decisions. 
RATIONAL INDI VIDUAL BEHAVIOR IN 
MARKE TS AND SOCIAL CHOICE PROCESSES 
Charles R. Plott 
Introduction 
The focus on individual behavior in economics is derived from an interest in 
the behavior of groups as they are found in markets, committees, and social 
choice processes. For the most part, economists have not been interested in 
what goes on inside the heads of individuals. Thought or thought processes 
are seldom considered as part of the phenomena to be studied as a part of the 
science. Economics is primarily a study of choice behaviors and their 
properties as they become manifest in the context of specific organizational 
units. By contrast, psychological focus on the individual is derived from a 
long history of research on the nature of thought and thought processes. In 
contrast to economics, psychological research does not seem to have been 
defined by any particular social, institutional, or organizational constraints. 
This essay is an attempt to integrate data and perspectives from these two, 
substantially different traditions, by introducing an observational theory that 
I will call the "discovered preference hypothesis." With the introduction of 
such a theory, two disclaimers are necessary at the very outset. Firstly, the 
perspective of the essay is distinctively economics. The objective is to 
improve models of economic and social choice processes. Contributions to 
psychology are neither attempted nor claimed. Secondly, the discovered 
preference hypothesis is more of a philosophy, or interpretation of data, than 
a clearly articulated theory from which precise quantitative propositions can 
be deduced. It is offered as a means of imposing some understanding on a 
very complex body of theory, and data generated by experimental 
economists and by psychologists. 
Because of differences in the nature of data, as well as differences in 
scientific objectives, it would seem to be important to make a clear statement 
of what is known, and not known, by way of modeling. On one hand, there 
seems to be little debate about the power of models built on principles of 
rational choice�, or on related concepts of purposeful choices, to predict the 
1The support for this project provided by the National Science Foundation, is gratefully acknowledged.
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behavior of groups of people, such as committees and markets. Models 
based on such principles are not free of error, which critics of economics are 
quick to reference, but the success of rationality based models in explaining 
what is obseived in experimental markets and committees cannot be denied. 
No model, theory, or concept, from any other branch of science yields 
models with comparable breadth and accuracy when applied to the behavior 
of groups of humans. Other models and theories might have the capacity to 
explain deviations of the data from predictions of the rational choice model. 
Other models might have the capacity to explain choice behavior after 
patterns of decisions are obseived; but, no other model has the demonstrated 
ability to produce the predictions in the first instance. Price formation in a 
market, the strategic behavior induced by market institutions, the power of 
an agenda, or the attractiveness of the equilibrium in committees operating 
under majority rule, cannot be explained by an appeal to principles of 
psychology. An understanding of supply and demand, and the nature of
game theoretical choices, seem to be indispensable for the task. If principles 
of psychology have a role to play in explaining social choices, it must be to 
explain deviations from the general tendencies explained by the rational 
choice models .. 
On the other hand, with that strong endorsement of rational models out of 
the way, the remaining parts of this essay will be devoted to some 
strategically chosen paradoxes that exist if the endorsement is accepted. The 
"deviations from the general tendencies explained by the rational choice 
models" can be substantial. The problems involve much more than simply 
placing a period at the end of a sentence written by economic theory. 
Examples of the paradoxes (or problem areas) seem to be of two types. The 
first type consists of situations in which the choosing individual has little or 
no previous experience with the choice/decision task. In economics and in 
political science, practical examples abound and range from a decision to 
buy a house, choose a wife, or support a new form of political constitution. 
The class of such examples, which will be called "new tasks," abound in 
economics and they are precisely the type of phenomena on which 
psychologists have focused. The second class of examples encompasses 
situations in which the behavior of another individual is important to a given 
individual. Again, examples are numerous in economics and political 
science, and include phenomena like the stock market, problems of 
coordination, e:tc. This second class will be called "other agent" examples. 
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The purpose of the essay is, in part, to identify an obseivational theory that 
is lurking in the background of the behavior obseived in the two classes of 
examples. For purposes of discussion, I will call it the discovered 
preference hypothesis. I think this hypothesis is often believed, but seldom
stated, and thus it should be brought into the light where it can be examined 
and criticized. The theory is that rational choices evolve through three 
stages reflecting experience and practice. Stage one occurs when experience 
is absent. Untutored choices reflect a type of myopia. The individual is 
purposeful and optimizing, but exhibits limited awareness about the 
immediate environment or the possible longer run consequences of any acts 
that might be taken. Responses are "instantaneous" or "impulsive," 
reflecting whatever may have been perceived as in self interest at the instant. 
To an "outsider," such behavior could appear to have a substantial random 
component because inconsistencies among choices may be present. 
Systematic aspects of choices might exist, reflecting attention and 
perceptions, but they might not make sense when viewed from the 
perspective of a preference based model. Stage two is approached as 
repeated choices, practice, incentives (feedback), provide sobering and re­
focusing experiences. Problems of the type found in the first class of 
examples are no longer present in the data. Choices begin to reflect and 
incorporate an awareness of the environment, and can be recognized by an 
"outsider" as a stable form of "strategy" or "decision." The full constancy of 
the rational model begins to find support in the data. However, problems of 
the sort contained in the second class of examples can still be detected. 
Stage three, the final stage, is one in which choices begin to anticipate the 
rationality reflected in the choices of others. The fact that others might be 
acting rationally, and the consequences of that rationality, as it works 
through the interdependent fabric of social institutions, become reflected in 
the choices of c!ach agent. 
The obseivational theory might not be as empty as it could seem on first 
glance. A little closer look suggests that it could be filled with enough 
substance to alienate everyone. The hypothesis suggests that attitudes like 
expectations, beliefs, risk aversion and the like, are discovered, as are
other elements of the environment. People acquire an understanding of what 
they want through a process of reflection and practice. In a sense, they do 
not know what they want and it may be costly, or even unpleasant, to go 
through the process of discovery. Attitude discovery is a process of 
evolution which has a direction, and in the final stage results in the 
"discovery" of a consistent and stable preference. Thus, while the final 
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product of the process may be a preference-like object that is very familiar to 
economic theory, economists seem to have very little to say about decisions 
that are made while it is coming into existence. So, economists have little 
reason to be happy with the observational theory because it suggests that the 
basic model has only limited applicability. Economists have a need to look 
elsewhere, or at least a need to look deeper into the decision process. 
On the other hand, the discovered preference hypothesis seems to be 
inconsistent with philosophy that is being used by psychologists, but there 
seems to be no inconsistencies with the data produced by psychologists. 
Psychologists tend to distinguish their work from what they call a 
"philosophy of articulated values," as opposed to a "philosophy of basic 
values," which the psychologists tend to embrace. The former, sometimes 
attributed to economists by the psychologists, would hold that people have 
well formed preferences or values.2 Choices are then made by reference to 
these values, which themselves are sta�le. By contrast, psychologists see 
themselves as operating under a philosophy of basic values from which 
preferences might be viewed as "constructed." The construction depends 
upon the mode in which a response is called. Task and context are thought 
to influence the construction and, as a result, preferences are thought to be 
labile if, indeed, they can be said to exist at all. Of course, if no preferences 
exist, then there is no foundation for a theory of optimization and no 
foundation for a theory of strategic behavior and game theory. The idea of 
constructed preferences would seem to leave very little room for economics 
and seems to be substantially contradicted by the existence of economic 
models that are so powerful in applications. 
If preferences are considered as having been "discovered," rather than 
"constructed," then room exists in the philosophy for the process of 
discovery to be influenced by the perceptions, attention, and the focus of 
individuals. The path of discovery could be influenced by the context of the 
situation, the initial conditions so to speak. Tversky, Sattath and Slovic 
(1988) articulate the paradox created by constructed preference theory well. 
"If different eliicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, 
how can preferences and values be defined? And in what sense do they 
exist?" (p.383).  The message suggested by the examples to be reviewed in 
the first section below is a possible answer to the question they pose. The 
2This attribution is not correct The economic literature contains many references to basic preferences, 
including preferences over attributes, from which other preferences are derived. The whole field of 
decision theory is devoted to a study of deductions from primitive notions of preferences to complex 
spaces of alternative acts. 
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effect of different problem frames is not so much to call forth different 
means of constructing attitudes, as it is to focus perceptions and attention to 
different features of the environment. The framing effects would then be 
interpreted as a filter, operating through attention and perception, which 
effects the information on which otherwise rational choices are made. In 
terms of the rational model, the framing effects would be the consequences 
of d ifferent information conditions and not the consequences of differently 
constructed preferences. Individuals' decisions ( attitudes) might be labile at 
first; reflecting only a limited perception of the immediate environment. 
With practice and experience, under conditions of substantial incentives, 
and with the accumulating information that is obtained from the process of 
choice, the attitudes stabilize in the sense of a consistent decision rule, 
reflecting the preferences that were "discovered" through the process. The 
final preferences show no evidence of being labile. 
Now, there are four facts that seem to go against the discovered preference 
hypothesis, as refined by the above paragraphs. (1) The stages of rationality 
are a property of an individual. Whether or not the stages exist at all may 
differ from individual to individual. Furthermore, the myopia of the first 
stage can retun1 if the environment changes. ( 2) Some types of rationality 
may never be acquired naturally. In particular, the rationality that comes 
from an understanding of the rationality of others might be difficult for some 
people to comprehend without some help. ( 3) Help in acquiring one type of 
rationality (knowledge of the rationality of others) can come in the form of 
special social institutions. But, if one type of rationality can be fostered by 
social institutions, the other types might be fostered that way as well. So, 
the fact that market institutions are specifically involved in the examples to 
be discussed might be critical to the fact that rationality/stable 
attitudes/preferences evolve (or are discovered) in the first place. 
The paper contains three sections. The first section is an elaboration of the 
first and second classes of behavior. The section consists of four examples 
in which the rationality of other agents is not important or difficult to 
understand. TI1e second section of the paper consists of examples of 
problems of the third class in which common knowledge of rationality 
becomes important to the functioning of the economic situation or the social 
process . The third section contains examples in which social institutions 
play a special role in conveying the nature of rationality of other agents in 
the economy. Together, the three sections of the paper describe a pattern of 
evidence that demonstrates a need to modify standard economic theory. The 
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section also suggests why a hypothesis of discovered preference might be 
more applicable than a hypothesis of constructed preference. 
I. NEW TASKS AND FAMILIAR TASKS : THE BEGINNING AND THE 
END OF AN EXPERIMENT 
Under conditions of "substantial " incentives,3 how does choice with an 
unfamiliar task compare with the choices of a familiar task? A natural 
setting is the beginning and the end of an experiment. The first part of an 
experiment almost always involves decisions with an unfamiliar task. It is 
not uncommon for a subject to tum to the experimenter and ask "what am I 
supposed to do?" The incentives are present, but frequently the subject has 
never done the task before. The experimenter simply reads the relevant 
portion of the instructions again. After the experiment has operated for 
awhile the people are familiar with the task. So, a comparison of behavior 
at the beginning and end of an experiment provides the data of interest. 
Four examples are studied. The first three can be interpreted as "games" 
with dominant strategies. Therefore, according to pure theory, the choice 
should be the same, independent of any experience or familiarity with the 
task. The fourth example is taken from a more complex setting in which a 
subject is operating in a continuous market, but the behavior studied has a 
common sense element of simplicity. 
The behavior exhibited in each of the examples can be interpreted as 
involving rather fundamental violations of rationality -- at first. However, 
with experience, the behavior becomes transformed into patterns that are 
more recognizable through the lens of preference and decision theory. If the 
early choices are interpreted as having been influenced by framing, then 
framing effects go away under the proper circumstances. The patterns of 
behavior ultimately look similar across individuals and are understandable in 
terms of theory. Thus, the framing in these examples could also be 
interpreted as reflecting a type of myopia, fostered by limited information, 
conditioned by the nature of perceptions and attention which, with 
experience under suitable incentives, does not persist. Thus, according to 
the observational theory, the discovered preference hypothesis, the violations 
3"Substantial" typically means that the individual has an opportunity to make about twice the amount that 
would be made in the individual's ordinary job. 
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of rationality might be more attributable to information and search rather 
than how a process of cognition works. 
A. The Preference Reversal Phenomena 
The preference reversal phenomena can be most easily understood by 
reference to Figure 1. Consider an individual faced with the possibility of 
playing one of the two lotteries represented by the pie charts. Lottery A 
yields a payoff of $ 4.00 with almost certainty, and a payoff of $0 with the 
small probability, as shown. Lottery B yields a payoff of $ 16.00, with a 
payoff of a little more than .33, and a payoff of $0, otherwise. Lottery A is 
frequently called the P bet, because the probability of winning something is 
large, and lottery B is called the $ bet, because the amount is large. 
When individuals are asked to choose, a large percentage will choose lottery 
A. However, when asked how much they would pay for the right to play the 
lotteries, the same individuals will pay more for the right to play lottery B.  
The inconsistency of the behavior is  apparent. The individual, when asked 
to state a preference in one way (Which would you choose?), lottery A is 
preferred but when asked to state preference in another way (Which is of 
greatest value to you?), lottery B is preferred. 
This inconsistency is what psychologists have called the preference reversal 
phenomenon. It has been an important example of what many believe to be 
the labile nature of preferences and how preferences are systematically 
influenced by the context of decision. The inconsistency is systematic, in 
the sense that reversals one way (P bet is preferred when choice is the 
response mode, and $ bet is preferred when values are the response mode) 
are observed with substantially greater frequency than the opposite reversal 
($ bet preferred under choice, and P bet valued higher) . The preference 
reversal phenomenon is the asymmetzy of the switching between the dollar 
bet and the P bet. The behavior is not simply random as it might be if 
individuals were only making mistakes. 
Recent experiments conducted by Cox and Grether (1993), inquired whether 
the preference reversals could be observed in market settings. They 
implemented an experimental design that had elements of both experimental 
economics and psychology. The experiments involved measuring the 
preferences for individuals for lotteries that have been used many times in 
the psychology literature. The methods of preference elicitation were those 
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that have been used by psychologists, but Cox and Grether used 
experimental market institutions as well. In addition, they paid off on every 
decision, so no decision was made on hypothetical values. The levels of 
incentives were on the order of those typically used in economics, as 
opposed to experiments found in the psychology literature, where incentives 
have tended not to be as large as the incentives that have been used in 
economics and in social choice experiments. Thus, the conditions of the 
experiments contained elements that are usually present in experimental 
markets where the rational models are observed working well. 
Cox and Grether first used methods of preference elicitation that have been 
used in the preference reversal literature. Choice data was acquired from 
pairwise choices of individuals. Preference data was acquired by application 
of the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak procedure.4 In addition, they used a 
second price auction (a market institution explained in the next section of 
this paper) to obtain pricing data and t:Q.ey used a English clock auction ( at 
first glance it has essential features of the Dutch clock auction) to obtain the 
choice data. Cox and Grether describe this auction as follows: "In this
auction, the price clock starts at the amount of the win state payoff in a bet 
and then decreases by five cents every second. Each subject must decide 
whether to choose to play the bet by exiting from the auction at the price 
showing on the: clock, or to remain in the auction. The last subject 
remaining in the auction receives the amount of money on the price clock 
when the next-to-the-last subject chooses the bet. All of the other subjects 
play the bet." Thus, at each stage of the process, the individual has a choice 
between the money shown on the clock or the bet . When the bet is preferred 
to the money the individual removes himself/herself from the auction.s 
The striking result of Cox and Grether is that the preference reversal 
phenomena is clearly observed at first under all experimental conditions 
(markets and incentives) . Then, after replication and experience under 
conditions of incentives and market institutions, the reversal phenomena 
goes away. It is not the market setting alone that removes the reversals since 
reversals appear when people first participate in the markets. It is also not 
repetition alone (without incentives) that makes the reversals go away, since 
4For a detailed account of how this incentive compatible preference elicitation procedure is used , see 
Grether and Plott (1979). 
5Some question always exists about whether the response mode was a "choice task" or a "pricing task." 
The fact the Cox and Grether replicate the reversal phenomenon seems to remove controversies of this 
nature. The data produced by the clock modes are those that are supposed to be produced by the choice 
modes. 
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the reversals persist in the market settings when the incentives are absent. 
However, a combination of the repetition in a market setting with incentives 
will provide an environment in which the preference reversal phenomena no 
longer exists. Furthermore, with repetition, the ( stochastic) element of 
choices decreases in the sense that the number of intransitivities6 in general 
goes down. 
Briefly put, the Cox and Grether experiments exhibit the pattern suggested 
by the theory advanced in the opening section. The classical preference 
reversal can be seen as a product of inexperience and lack of motivation, and 
it goes away with experience in a market setting. 
B.  The Second Price Auction 
The second price auction is a special auction in which the object is awarded 
to the highest bidder, but the price paid. is the bid of the second highest 
bidder. If multiple units are sold, the bids are arrayed from the highest to the 
lowest . If K units are to be sold they are given to the K highest bidders, but 
all of the winners pay a price equal to the K+ 1 bid. If it is a selling auction, 
then the bids are arrayed from lowest to the highest, and the K winners all 
sell at a price equal to the K + 1 bid. 
From a game theoretic perspective the optimal strategy in a second price 
auction is obvious. Under a wide class of environments ( independent private 
values) the optimal strategy is to bid the individual private value. That is, 
the optimal strategy is to "reveal" in the bid the "true" willingness to pay or 
"true" willingness to sell. Revelation is a dominant strategy. Yet, when 
confronted with the task, individuals typically do not choose the optimal. 
Bidding the value is a dominant strategy and not only is the logic clear, it 
should be clear at an intuitive level. But, the obvious is not necessarily 
reflected in behavior when individuals are first confronted with the task. 
However, after experience, as is the case with the other examples in this 
section of the paper, choices converge in the direction of the choices 
predicted by theory to be the optimum. 
The data to be viewed are generated from a typical multiple unit second 
price auction as it is used in applications.7 Values are drawn independently 
6The measure of the: number of intransitivities is the same as that used by Tversky, Slovic, and 
Kahneman (1990). 
7This means that the� conditions of the theory are not faithfully imposed in this experiment. In particular, 
the buyers are acquiring more than one unit and a variable number of units is being sold. Thus, if one 
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for each agent from a uniform distribution with support [0,250] . If the value
V is drawn for an individual then that individual can redeem the item for a 
value of V with the experimenter and keep as profit the difference between 
the price paid for the unit and the value. In the Cox and Grether research, 
discussed in the previous section, the items sold were lotteries so the "true" 
values are not known to the experimenter except perhaps through 
comparative measurements. In the example discussed in this section the 
values are known to the experimenter so deviations from true revelation can 
be observed. 
Figure 2 displays the (V, bid) pairs. The * are data from the first three 
periods of the experiment, and the 0 are the data from the last three periods. 
Theory (essentially) maintains that all data should be on the 450 line. Data 
above the line are "irrational" by any concept in economics. Data below the 
line could have some interpretations, but for purposes of discussion, here are 
not important. The important thing to ()bserve is that the movement of the 
data between the first three and last three periods is toward the line. That is, 
the behavior of the agents exhibits increasing rationality over the course of 
the experience.. The model is not a perfect predictor of what people do. For 
example, there is ample room for speculation about why people might have 
bid more than the value and why such phenomena should persist even so late 
in the experiment as the 17th period. Nevertheless, the model does predict 
the exact form of the responses and not only is the movement of the data in 
that direction, no other model generates predictions that are of equal 
accuracy. 
One is tempted to claim that the evolution of behavior observed in the 
experiments is simply one in which subjects adopt an obvious rule of thumb. 
Is it the case that individuals are simply adopting a "linear rule of thumb" 
and reflect no rationality or strategic behavior at all? Existing data suggests 
that such a hypothesis can be rejected. The data are of two sorts. First, if 
the rules are changed from a second price auction to a first price auction then 
behavior changes accordingly and in ways predicted by game theory. 
Secondly, experimentation exists with cases in which the predictions of 
game theory are decidedly nonlinear. Chen and Plott (1992) inquired about 
the degree of complexity that must be present in rules of thumb in order that 
they be an improvement over the nonlinear rules that are deduced from the 
wants to see a clear test of the theory these data are not appropriate. Nevertheless, except for the "near 
extra marginal units" which should be those with the lowest values, the optimal strategy is to bid value. 
Bids should never bl� above value. 
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optimization principles of game theory. Analysis shows that if (piece wise) 
linear rules are going to be an improvement over the complex rules that are 
predicted by game theory, then the piece wise rules must be rather complex 
(have several strategically chosen "pieces") .  None of the simple linear rules 
perform as well as does the game theoretic model. It seems fair to say that 
individuals are not adopting some simplistic rule, like a markdown rule, or a 
rule that would "guarantee" some profit level. 
In summary, the second price auction data suggests that individual behavior 
in an unfamiliar task exhibits aspects of !ability and randomness. With 
experience and incentives, the behavior takes a form that is  more 
recognizable from a rational choice perspective. The example explored in 
the next section is a continuation of this thesis. The example is a little more 
complex and the nature of the "optimal" strategy is open to more questions 
but the general pattern, reported so far, will be reported there as well. 
C .  Contributions to Public Goods Provision 
Experiments with public goods provision take the following form. Each 
individual in a group is given a function in the form of a table or graph that 
indicates the dollar payoff to him/her as a function of the group decision 
regarding the magnitude of some variable X.  That is, each individual i is  
given a payoff function fl( X ) and is  tested on his/her ability to understand
the function. If the group chooses a level of X, say X= 10, then individual 
receives a dollar payment from the experimenter equal to fl( 10 ) .  The group
choice of X is made by anonymous contributions to a fund to pay for the 
level of X.  That is, if the contribution of individual i to the fund is Xi and if 
the per unit cost of the variable X is C, then the level chosen by the group is 
X=(I.x. )IC . The amount of dollars that individual i receives is the payoff 
j I 
from the level of public good provided, minus the amount of his/her own 
contribution to the provision. That is {net dollar payoff to i }  = P(X)-xi .
The cases of interest are those in which the experience is repeated a number 
of times. With each repetition, the members of the group may or may not be 
the same, depending upon the purposes of the experiment. 
1 1  
The classical public goods problem, articulated by Samuelson, suggested 
that individuals have a dominant strategy not to voluntarily contribute to the 
provision of public goods. That is, the "rational " strategy is Xi= 0 for all i.
The situation is not unlike the prisoner's dilemma in which the dominant 
strategy Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Experimenters desiring to 
explore the situation carefully, chose parameters for public goods 
experiments such that the dominance existed. 
The data from experiments indicate that substantial contributions can be 
observed occurring during the first part of the experiments. With replication 
of periods and incentives the contributions do drop off, but the data from the 
initial periods in which contributions occur stand in sharp contrast to a 
theory of rational choice which holds that the level of voluntary 
contributions should be zero. 
An attempt to save the rational model took the fonn of a theory that gives
preferences themselves an endogenous component. The theory is that 
individuals have a "cooperative " nature. Their first instincts are to be 
"truthful " about what they want. According to this revised theory of 
rational choice, individuals "truthfully reveal" their most desired outcome 
and do what they can to make it happen. One could say that the "frame" is 
one in which cooperation through giving is an obvious thing to do, so people 
do it. For several years the data were accepted as having been explained by
this theory of endogenous, or "home grown" attitudes. 
It appears now, that the apparent support of this theory of truthful revelation 
is a consequence of the randomness of initial choice behavior supported by 
an artifact of the experimental design. All of the early experiments were 
similar. In particular, the optimal strategic (Nash) response under the 
parameters studied was a choice of zero contribution to the public good. 
Choices below zero were not permitted by virtue of the structure of the 
strategy space, and choices above zero were interpreted as reflecting 
cooperative/truthful responses. Stated this way, the potential for a 
misinterpretation of the behavior is obvious. Any pure randomness of 
responses, resulting from confusion, or lack of reflection, would show up as 
a positive contribution to the public good and would, thus, be counted as 
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that the data reveal Nash response with an error, has emerged as a 
competitor to the theory that people are naturally cooperative. 
The data from the older literature cannot be used to untangle the two 
theories. However, the newer literature is more successful. The data from 
new public goods experiments suggests the hypothesis that the behavior of 
people, when initially confronted with the task, is neither cooperative nor 
truthful. Instead, the behavior first exhibited by people is consistent with the 
hypothesis that it reflects large random components derived from lack of 
decisiveness as an individual works his/her way through the information. As 
an individual gains experience with the task, considered decisions begin to 
emerge. 
Unfortunately, there are not many papers to review. The possibility that 
random behavior could be misinterpreted. as cooperative behavior has not 
gone without notice, 8 but the problem has not been a high priority among 
experimentalists. 
The relevant experiments are those in which the Nash equilibrium is not on 
the lower boundary of the strategy set. In two papers9 Nash equilibria on the
upper boundary of the strategy set are studied. Under such parameters the 
Nash strategies are also the strategies that would be chosen under a 
cooperative strategy, or an "other regarding" strategy. Choices of 
contributions less than the Nash contribution must result from some other 
process of choice. In the first study (Saijo and Yamaguchi), the
contributions are below the Nash ( self interested) response, starting with the 
first period. While the choices are interpreted by the authors of the study as 
being "spiteful," the data also support the interpretation that the choices 
reflect a fundamental randomness. Of course, random elements would look 
virtually the same, so the two interpretations of the data cannot be separated. 
In the second study in which the Nash equilibrium is on the upper
boundary( Palfrey and Prisbrey), the data are near the Nash equilibrium from 
'The most recent review of the public goods experimental literature has a special section on this issue. 
See Ledyard ( 1995). 
'l>alfrey and Prisbrey (1993). Saijo and Yamaguchi (1992). 
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the very first period. As a result, little changes in individual behavior are 
observed over the course of the experiment. 
In two additional papersI0 the Nash equilibrium was placed strictly on the 
interior of the strategy set. Random behavior could be on either side of the 
Nash response. Presumably, initial attempts to be cooperative would result 
in choices that begin with contributions above the Nash and then converge 
toward Nash with replication of the experience. In both studies decisions are 
on the non cooperative side of Nash at first, and then converge toward the 
Nash response after replication of experience. 
Thus, all four of the studies suggest that responses have a substantial 
variance during the first periods. The variance can result in choices on either 
side of Nash and thus, can appear as either cooperative or as spiteful 
behavior. The variance falls over time and settles near the Nash response 
with repetition of the experience. The exception is the Palfrey and Prisbrey 
study in which the responses are near Nash from the start, do not have such a 
large variance at first, and do not change with repetition. Briefly put, none 
of these studies support the idea of "truthful" revelation as an overriding and 
general property of the initial responses of people in a public goods 
experiment.II Instead, the studies support the idea that what has appeared to 
be a tendency toward truthfulness is actually something else. The initial 
choices of individuals have a random component. With experiences and 
incentives, game theoretic principles tend to emerge. 
D. The Continuous Double Auction and the Jfvatat Phenomena
The next example is taken from markets that operate in continuous time. 
From a theoretical point of view, optimal behavior is unknown, but behavior 
is observed that is both systematic and difficult to rationalize with any 
concept of optimality other than what might result from a type of myopia. 
The example is particularly interesting because it demonstrates how market 
H>walker, Gardner, and Ostrom (1990). Andreoni (1993). 
11 The work of Isaac and Walker (1988a, 1988b) with very large groups, stands as a stark counter­
example to this general proposition. Some speculation exists that experimental control (or the lack of it), 
over very large groups, is a contributing factor to the results. Isaac and Walker are continuing a research 
program designed to investigate all of such possibilities. 
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level phenomena can be effected by the decision behavior of one or two 
individuals who seem to be deviating from the ordinarily accepted rules of 
rationality. 
As part of a process of establishing a program of experimental economics in 
Moscow, researchers began with a project of attempting to replicate 
phenomena that has been widely observed in laboratory economics in the 
west ( Menshikov, Menshikova, and Plott, 1993) . The project involved 
several different subject pools from Moscow, which participated in classical 
computerized multiple unit double auctions. The basic choice of parameters 
also involved a single upward shift of demand and supply that was not 
anticipated by the subjects. The purpose of the shift was simply to 
document the ability of the model to predict the actual time path of the 
market. The parameters also involved an asymmetry between demand and 
supply of a sort that ordinarily causes the observed prices to converge to 
equilibrium from above, and the experimental design also called for an 
occasional imposition of non binding price ceilings that are known to effect 
market dynamics. 
The markets converged to the competitive equilibrium, but the surprising 
result from the experiments was that the price variance in some experiments 
was much higher than has been observed in the west. Furthermore, the 
expected features of market dynamics, the direction of convergence and the 
reaction to price ceilings, were not observed. Close scrutiny of the data 
resulted in the discovery of types of individual subject behavior that, upon 
reflection, has been observed in the west but not to such a pronounced 
extent. 
!J{vatat in Russian means "to grab." The individuals in these experiments
had no experience with market economies and with the related rules. They 
grew up in an economy in which prices were frequently fixed at levels that 
were too low and, as a result, shortages were a part of daily experiences. 
The habits of the population included a propensity to acquire anything of 
value at any time that it was encountered, in hope that it could be used or 
traded for something else. If the act of acquisition was not quick (fivatat)
someone else would have it and the opportunity would be gone. The term, 
fivatat, became applied to behavior in experiments because the Russian
scientists saw the behavior in the experiments as analogous to behavior they 
observed in the society around them. The behavior is by no means 
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irrational, but it does reflect a special type of training or expectation on the 
part of the subjects. 
Once the proper patterns of behavior had been identified, one naturally 
looked for similar patterns in data from the western markets and, once 
attention was so directed, examples were easy to find. The example to be 
considered here is a double auction experiment that was conducted with 
students from the California Institute of Technology. This market 
experiment is the same as many that have been conducted in the west and, 
except for a few details of the parameters, it is the same as the experiments 
that were conducted in Moscow. 
The induced demand and supply functions are shown in Figure 3. The time 
series of contract prices is shown in Figure 4. The vertical axis is the price 
of the contract, and the horizontal axis measures clock time in seconds so the 
figure shows the seconds at which contracts took place. The horizontal 
lines represents the upper and lower bounds of the set of competitive 
equilibria for this simple market that are shown in Figure 3, at the 
intersection of the demand and supply curves. 
Even an untrained eye will notice that the prices tend to converge to near the 
competitive equilibrium. This is the power of the double auction that is 
observed universally. What the untrained eye might not notice is the 
variance of the market prices. The reader is asked to take on faith that the 
variability of prices in this market is high relative to most market 
experiments, whether conducted in the east or the west. Close examination 
of the data suggests that the variability seems to be due to the actions of a 
select few people. In particular, the contracts of seller number 10 in Figure 
4, are filled in with black. 
Figure 4 shows clearly that seller 10 managed to sell at the lowest prices 
almost every period. In fact, a study of the figure will show that all of the 
sales of seller 10 are below the average of the prices that existed in the 
market in any period. Relative to other sellers, and relative to the prices that 
existed in the market, seller 10 is performing poorly at making profits. 
The pattern of behavior that leads to this relatively unprofitable behavior can 
be interpreted as having resulted from a type of myopia. First, this 
individual tends to react to the environment as opposed to acting on it. In 
order to see this property, examine Figure 5 which contains the activities of 
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seller 10. In the double auction sellers are free to send asks to the market 
which they hope some buyer will take and buyers send bids to the market. A 
contract can be made by the seller accepting the bid of a buyer or a buyer 
accepting the ask of some seller. The asks and the contracts of seller 10 are 
shown in the figure at the time when they occurred. The asks tendered by 
seller 10 are the diamonds and the contracts are the circles. A circle filled 
with black is a contract in which an ask of seller 10 was accepted by some 
bidder and the open circles are contracts in which seller 10 accepted a bid of 
some buyer. As is clear, seller 10, for the most part, accepts bids offered 
by buyers. In the entire experiment seller 10 had only three of his asks taken 
by a buyer. On all other occasions seller 10 accepted bids. 
Secondly, the individual does not seem to understand how to be successful 
in acting within the environment. From Figure 5, the reader can see that the 
asks of seller 10 have a tendency to be "away from the market." This seller's 
asks, represented by the demands in the figure, are much too high to be 
accepted with any reasonable frequency. The asks tend to be unrealistic 
above the levels at which trades are taking place, and no well placed asks 
are tendered by the individual. In order to see this, study Figure 6 which
displays the asks of seller 10 as black-filled diamonds, along with the asks 
of seller 9 whose pattern of asks are typical for the sellers and are shown as 
open diamonds. As can be seen, the asks of seller 9 are close to the 
competitive equilibrium and are strategically chosen to be close to the 
market, with a realistic expectation that one would be accepted. By contrast, 
the asks of seller 10 are all well removed above all the market activity. 
Third, seller 10 tends to act quickly to "grab" opportunities with little regard 
to the opportunity cost or the possible consequences if considered over a 
"long" horizon. It is as if the individual sees an opportunity to make an 
instantaneous gain and grabs it with little regard for the benefits that might 
accrue to a more considered action. This type of quickness tends to be 
reinforcing because it prevents the individual from surveying what is 
happening in the environment and thereby tends to deflect attention from 
information that might result in a change in the behavior. 
The quickness can be seen in all of the figures. Seller 10 tends to make 
trades in the first parts of all periods. Table 1 provides some descriptive 
statistics for sellers 6 and 10, both of whom have a tendency to trade at the 
low prices. The table gives the number of trades that occurred in the first 
thirty seconds of a ( six minute) period and the number of trades that 
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occurred in the whole ( six minute) period, for all sellers and for sellers 6 
and 10 considered as a pair. On average, 31 % of the total market volume 
occurs in the first 30 seconds of the six minute period. About 55% of the 
total volume of the six sellers that occurs in the first thirty seconds is  due to 
two sellers alone, sellers 6 and 10 who sell 64% of their volume in these 
opening seconds. These two sellers are quick to unload their volume even 
though this is the time when prices are lowest, as can be seen by a return to 
Figure 4. 
The pattern described is the following. The seller is quick to act. The seller 
accepts the terms offered by a buyer and is not aggressive in offering terms 
himself in the form of asks, and seldom places a successful ask. The 
individual reacts quickly to take what is offered without "negotiating" or 
considering what alternatives might be presented. It i s  interesting to note 
that this behavior is a consistent property of an individual and is  not a 
property of a group, or the random behavior of members of a group. The 
Russians have called such individuals "rabbits" and theorize that people who 
are not so myopic develop characteristics of "wolves" who anticipate rabbit 
behaviors and set traps with selective bids. An attempt to identify "wolf '
behavior would involve an excessive deviation from the general theme of 
this paper and so the idea will drop here. With or without the wolves, the 
rabbits tend to act less impulsively as time and experience take place. The 
price patterns tend to lose the variance and the whole system tends to 
converge to the equilibrium as predicted by the competitive model. 
II. OTHER AGENTS AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE OF
RATIONALITY 
From time to time, over the years, complicated experiments have been 
conducted that did not work out exactly as expected, in theory. The 
perplexing aspects of the experiments were frequently reported as a 
curiosity, along with the other results that were understandable. Looking 
back over these experiments, in the light of the advance and refinements of 
experimental techniques, and a growing number and types of experiments, 
general patterns tend to suggest themselves. One such pattern seems to be 
due to a lack of understanding on the part of some agents, of the 
motivations, intentions, and behavior of other agents that are participants in 
the process. Formally, within the context of game theoretic models ,  the 
patterns seem to be due to the possibility that rationality is not common 
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knowledge. Six examples of possible cases can be listed that may prove to 
be cases. 
A. Mixed Strategies 
The obseived lack of independence in mixed strategies is the first example. 
The aggregated choices of agents participating in conflicts, for which the 
game theoretic model has no pure strategy equilibrium, are well 
approximated by the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game. However, the 
strategies of an individual do not have the property of independence that is 
crucial for the security property that the mixed strategy is supposed to 
provide. If other players are believed to be fully rational, then the 
independence is necessary. 
B. Agendas and Voting 
The second example comes from agenda theory and the operation of 
committee processes. An agenda can be imposed as a partitioning of the
options into subsets for discussion and voting . For example, if the options 
were indexed by the letters of the alphabet, then a motion could be that the 
group chose a vowel . If the motion passes then further motions are restricted 
to the set { ( a, e, i, o, u) }. If the original motion fails, then ( depending upon 
the exact wording of the original motion) the deliberations are restricted to 
the set of consonants, and additional motions will be to restrict that set. As 
the motions continue, sets are removed from further consideration until only 
one option is left. The agendas are usually applied to a finite set of options 
that are not labeled with letters or numbers, so the actual motions are 
typically something that would make sense to an ordinary human. The 
example is intended only to carry the intuition that an agenda is a refinement 
of partitions of a finite set, such that at the end of each branch is a single 
element. The committee process is then a series of votes, each of which will 
eliminate a set of options until only one option remains as the committee 
choice. 
The influence of the agenda on committee decisions is well documented. It 
is possible to design agendas that can get the group to chose almost anything 
that the designer desires. The phenomena is not related to the classical 
cyclical majorities. Even if all members of the group have the same 
preference, the agenda designer can still have considerable power. 
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The power of the agenda seems to depend upon tight control of the 
information that individuals in the group have, and it depends upon aspects 
of 11 myopia 11 that the theory presupposes exists in individuals in the group. 
First, the theory assumes that the individual chooses randomly among three 
decision rules: ( i) vote for the set that contains the most preferred option; 
( ii) vote against the set that contains the least preferred option; ( iii) vote for 
the set that contains the highest average "payoff' of options. The data show 
that if individual decisions are restricted to these three rules then individuals 
are using different rules at each of the different stages of voting. Secondly, 
the theory assumes that the probability with which a decision rule is used is 
independent of past votes. That is, the theory treats individuals as if they 
have random features of behavior and that individuals completely ignore the 
behavior of others. The fact that others might be behaving rationally, and
that the rationality of others has consequences for one's own voting behavior, 
is not part of the model. 
Now, the agenda model was not developed to study rationality, or the lack of 
it in individuals or in groups. It was developed as a tool to manipulate 
groups and to help individuals understand the subtle ways that they might be 
manipulated by others. The model operates by letting the agenda designer 
deduce a probability over the outcomes that depends upon the agenda ( and 
the behavioral probabilities used) . Thus, the agenda designer can find the 
agenda that maximizes the probability that the group chooses some option 
that the designer wants chosen. Whether or not the lack of rationality in the 
model is aesthetically pleasing is not particularly important because the 
model works. It is an effective tool for the job for which it was invented. 
The assumed myopia on the part of voters is simply part of the machinery 
that helps it do its job. 
C .  Winner's Curse 
The winners curse is another example in which knowledge of the rationality 
of others seems to be a missing element of individual decisions. The 
winners curse, first observed by Kagel and Levin (1986), occurs in what 
are called common value, first price auctions. Briefly put, and contrary to 
theory, in these auctions the winners repeatedly lose money. Furthermore, 
it does not seem to go away with experience. 
A value of an object is randomly determined. For example, a value is 
drawn from $0 to $300 and the individual who buys the object can resell it to 
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the experimenter for the value drawn. Suppose the value of the object is 
V=$150. The value is unknown to all bidders at the time that bids must be 
tendered, but each individual is given a personal "clue" to the value. That is, 
for each individual a clue is drawn from a uniform distribution with support 
[V-E, V+E] where E is some constant known to all individuals. For 
example, suppose E =$30. If individual i is given the clue $140, then the
individual knows that the true value of the object is somewhere in the 
interval [ $170-$30, $17o+$30] and must formulate a bid for the object 
based on that information, together with the knowledge that other individuals 
are receiving clues that are independently drawn from the same distribution. 
The winner is the person that bids the highest and, almost without exception, 
the winner pays more for the object than the object is worth. The theory of 
bidding requires that the individual must realize that people with the highest 
clues are going to be the ones that bid the most. This follows from 
rationality. But, this means that the person with the highest clue will be the 
winner and, almost certainly, the person with the highest clue will have a 
clue that lies above the true value of the object. Thus, in bidding the 
individual must "scale back" the bid to condition on an appropriate order 
statistic. The individual must realize that if he/she has the highest bid, then 
he/she also has a clue that is greater than the value of the object. Kagel and 
Levin postulate that the winner's curse results from an inappropriate scaling 
back, if not a complete neglect of the consequences of the rationality of 
others. 
D. Lemons in Markets 
A fourth example comes from experiments that are designed to explore the 
possibility of markets for "lemons" - as in used cars, not fruit (Lynch, 
Miller, Plott, and Porter, 1986) . In these experiments, sellers of an object
have an option of delivering two different qualities of the thing. A seller can 
deliver a "super" grade, which is valued highly by the buyers, but also is 
costly to the sellers, or, the seller can deliver a "regular" grade that is less 
desirable to the buyers, but the cost is much less to the sellers. 
Given the parameters chosen for the experiment, only supers would be 
produced and sold in the market if the quality of the commodity was known 
to the buyer at the time of the sale. The regulars are the lemons. Several 
different conditions of information have been studied but, for purposes of 
the discussion here, the interesting experiments are those in which the 
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quality was unknown to the buyer at the time of the sale. The quality was 
determined after the sale by the seller. Furthermore, there were never 
discussions between the buyer and the seller, and the buyer did not know the 
identity of the seller at the time of the sale or at any time after that. 
The incentives of the seller under such conditions is clear, at least from the 
point of view of the theory. The seller has an incentive to offer at a high 
price hoping that the buyer will think that the seller will deliver a super and 
take the deal, and then the seller will deliver a regular. Buyers, 
understanding the motivation of the sellers, will never assume that the seller 
will deliver a super and only engage in deals that will be profitable if a 
regular is delivered. The net result should be that only regulars are delivered 
at prices that fully reflect the fact that only regulars will be delivered. The 
market will be filled with "lemons" and sold at prices that reflect the fact that 
the buyers know that they are buying lemons. 
When the buyers first encounter the situation, many pay the high prices as if 
they were buying a super quality and knew it. This phenomena occurred in 
all subject pools of the experiments. The buyers did not apply the rationality 
logic contained in the paragraph above. On the other hand, sellers responded 
as anticipated by theory. Only regulars were delivered by the sellers. The 
experience after the first period or two, fostered a dramatic change of 
behavior in the buyers. Buyers would find caution immediately and prices 
would drop. In some subject pools the prices would ca�e immediately after 
the first period to near the price that would exist if buyers knew for certain 
that a regular would be delivered. However, in one subject pool, the prices 
would drop after the first period but, even after eight periods, prices were 
still too high, suggesting that the buyers really did not understand the seller's 
motivations. Buyers were simply treating the market as a lottery in which 
some probability of a super existed. After several experiences in such 
markets, different days of experimentation -- each involving several periods, 
the behavior of the buyers began to reflect an understanding of the 
motivations of the sellers. Such an understanding was not immediate by 
virtue of buyers having reasoned their way through the situation. For some 
subjects it took a lot of experience and time. The rationality was not 
common knowledge. 
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E. The Centipede Game 
The centipede game is a process in which two individuals participate in a 
finite sequence of moves. The options at each move include two amounts of 
money { x,y } with x>2y. The chooser can take one (the highest) of the 
amounts of money, leaving the other amount for the other person and, 
thereby, ending the game; or, he/she can pass the choice back to the other 
person. If the choice is passed back, both amounts of money double and the 
second person has the choice. The game continues for a finite and known 
number of stages. 
The only game (perfect information, Nash) theoretic solution is for the first 
chooser to take the money and stop the game. If both individuals are
rational, then the logic of backward deduction can be applied. Working 
backward at each stage, the logic is that if the game reaches that stage then it 
should stop there. The logic works back to the beginning of the game. 
The centipede game shown at the top of Table 2 was studied by McKelvey 
and Palfrey (1992) . The game started with the amount { $.40, $.10} and if it 
continued to the final stage the amounts would have grown to { $25.60, 
$6.40} .  The data are partitioned into two sets according to the experience 
that the subject had with the game. Each subject played the game ten times 
with ten different people. The results of the first 5 games are at the top of 
the page and the results of the second 5 games are at the bottom. 
Each game could have involved seven choices. The table indicates the 
number of games that had terminated at a given stage. For example, in the 
first five games no game terminated at the first choice. The probability of 
termination goes up as the stage increases. For example, if a game reached 
the 4th stage the probability of termination at that stage was .43. However, 
in the second five games, after individuals had experienced the first five, the 
probability of termination if the game reached the 4th stage was .65. 
Notice, that even in the second ten games, only 1 % of the games terminated 
at the first move. The tendency to terminate moves forward as individuals 
gain experience, but it would appear that the presumption of common 
knowledge of rationality cannot be supported by these results. 
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F. Bubbles in Asset Markets 
The final example in this section is from experiments motivated by financial 
markets. Consider an asset with a fifteen period life. Each period of its life 
it pays a dividend drawn with equal probability from the set { $.60, $.28, 
$.08, $.00 } .  Since the expected value of the dividend is $.24 each period, 
the draws are independent, and the life is fifteen periods, the fundamental 
value of a unit of the asset is $3.60 before the first dividend is paid. The 
fundamental value then drops by $.24 each period because of the payment of 
the dividend and the consequent red�ction in the number of dividends left to 
be paid. 
The dividend structure is common knowledge. Each subject is tested for 
understanding and has a chart in front of him/her from which the 
fundamental values can be read. The charts are explained publicly. 
Furthermore, at the end of each period the individuals record the 
fundamental values when computing the value of what they hold. There 
should be no misunderstanding about the values of the dividends or the 
fundamental value of the asset. 
At the beginning of the experiment each individual is given an endowment 
of the asset and/or cash, so securities can be bought or sold as the individual 
might want. The market is a computerized double auction at California 
Institute of Technology and the subjects were knowledgeable about the 
operations of an electronic market. 
The time series of trades are contained in Figure 7. The prices are on the 
vertical axis and time in seconds is on the horizontal. The two line sloping 
from upper left to lower right bound the possible values. The lower line is 
the fundamental value that starts at $3.60 and falls by $.24 each period. The 
upper line represents the maximum possible dividends. That is, the line 
represents the value of the asset if it paid the maximum possible each period 
of the remaining periods of its life. 
The time series of trades is dramatic. Prices move quickly through the 
fundamental expected value, stabilize with a slight inflation. The high prices 
continue until the fourteenth period when a violent market crash occurs. 
Prior to the crash, prices were above even the maximum that could be paid 
by dividends. This behavior is in stark contrast to a very natural theory 
which maintains that by applying backward deduction, depending upon the 
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rationality of all people at each step, the price should have been 
approximately the fundamental value in each period. However, if an 
individual thinks that the price will stay high across any two periods it will 
pay to buy the asset, collect the dividend, and sell the asset back for what 
was paid for it. The dividend will thus be obtained for free. 
If people do not think that all other people are rational then it might pay to 
speculate. According to Smith, Suchanik., and Williams (1988) , the 
backward induction tends to work after subjects have experience with each 
other. They maintain that common knowledge of rationality is acquired by 
observation and experience. The problem is directly related to the "swing 
back hypothesis" that was first observed by Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott 
( 1 982). 
The problem with other minds and other people is beginning to surface as 
economic theory and experiments begin to explore deeply into situations of 
asymmetric information. Social processes have the capacity to integrate 
information that is known only privately and is disbursed throughout the 
economy. Common knowledge of rationality is a cornerstone of how such 
processes might work. Experimental work suggests that this is the most 
difficult level of rationality and cannot be found reliably in many people and 
may be acquired only through experience. 
On the other hand, perhaps rationality is not common knowledge because 
rationality is not a fact. Some people may behave in strange ways for the 
reasons outlined in this paper. If that is the case, then how can the models 
be modified to account for it? Experimentalists have begun to explore the 
implications of the idea advanced by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson 
( 1 982). The hypothesis that irrationalities exist, and that a known probability 
exists that you may be involved with such a type, has begun to be 
systematically integrated into the behavioral models. That probability is 
then treated to the complete menu of rationality in a striking analysis by El­
Gamal, McKelvey, and Palfrey ( 1 993) and El-Gamal, McKelvey, and 
Palfrey ( 1 994).
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ill. SPECIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF
RATIONALITY 
Economists and political scientists typically study social behavior in a 
framework of institutions. The special role that these institutions play in 
shaping rational choice may be more important than is commonly 
understood. It could be that the social institutions reflect, and may even be 
built from internal process that shape outward forms of rationality. The 
thesis advanced here is that social institutions must help individuals, as a 
group, overcome three problems: ( i) myopia, ( ii) a problem of perception 
that is closely related to myopia, and ( iii) a problem related to the public 
nature of rationality. The instruments that work, in the sense of fostering 
efficient interactions, have solved or contribute to the solution of those three 
problems. 
Four examples of such institutions are closely related to the examples 
explored in the section above. Each institution calls attention to the 
information that it contains. There is nothing subtle about the signal that is 
conveyed. Each institution carries information about the preferences of 
some other agent, or group of agents, in the system. Each institution 
involves a complete account of the fact the individual whose preferences are 
suggested is prepared to act on those preferences. If the institution is 
functioning properly, little is left to the imagination about what might be 
going on in the other person's mind. 
In agenda process and committees, in the absence of the possibility of a
caucus, or other institutions that allow meetings of subgroups, a critical 
institution is the straw vote on issues that are scheduled to be voted upon 
later. Now, straw votes can involve cheap talk, but under conditions in 
which information about the preferences are restricted to no other source, the 
talk is not cheap. If the agenda is tightly controlled, then committee 
members have no opportunity to form coalitions, or even to determine if 
other people exist who might be willing to coordinate strategies. Straw 
votes are a way in which individuals can find each other and signal intent. 
In committee experiments straw votes are thought to undo much of the
power of the agenda. The advice to those who are using the agenda for 
purposes of manipulation is to avoid straw votes. In essence, the straw vote
changes the order of the agenda by letting people know now what will 
happen when the subsequent stage of decision is reached. The straw vote 
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helps the individual solve the backward induction problem, but because of 
the possibility of cheap talk, it is not an ideal vehicle. 
The lemons problem, described as the fourth example in the section above, 
can be solved by the institution of enforceable warranties. Express 
warranties, if offered by the seller, and if enforceable, will do the trick. The
seller guarantees that if a lemon (a "regular" in the language of the
experiment) is delivered, it will be replaced by a high quality item (a  
"super") at no cost to the buyer. The buyer, seeing the pre-commitment by 
the seller and knowing the interest of the seller is to deliver a non-lemon, 
will buy as if the quality of the item is known. In effect, the buyer is 
accepting the rationality of the seller and is using that knowledge to form 
his/her own decisions. The prices will reflect the certainty. The sellers will 
not deliver lemons and the system will be removed from the inefficient 
lemons equilibrium. Thus, the express warranty performs a function in the 
system of changing the strategy of the seller and letting the buyer know that 
it is in the interest of the seller to change. 
Two examples of special institutions can be taken from financial markets. 
The first example is a futures market which addresses the problem of 
bubbles and crashes, demonstrated in the section above. The bubble seems 
to be due to an incapacity of the system to support a process of backward 
induction. If some individual is "confused," then he/she might buy in one of
the final periods, even if prices are "too high." That possibility, at any stage, 
will circumvent the backwards induction process. A futures market solves 
that problem. The purchase and sale of futures contracts signals intent and 
commitment at the later stages of the game. An individual participating in
the early periods of the market, who sees that the futures market is low for 
the later periods, knows that the spot price will be low when the future time 
arrives. 12 Thus, the information about futures prices or, more specifically, 
information about the plans of other agents in the market, that would 
otherwise not become known until the future date arrived, are brought to the 
present by the instrument. The futures price is prominent and calls attention 
to itself. The meaning of the futures price is not difficult to ascertain. It is a 
sale now for delivery in the future. There is no speculation about what 
people might do in the future because they have already pre-committed to 
those decisions. The rationality is revealed. 
12 Analysis of institutions, like futures markets, must be sensitive to special features that might exist with
some variations of the institution. In some markets, futures contracts must be covered. An individual 
cannot be "short." Speculation that the short position is too large can itself be a source of speculation and 
will interact with the market in ways that will prevent the backward induction process. 
27 
The second example from finance is technical but it is worthy of mention. It 
is known that compound securities can have difficulties in achieving "state 
revealing" rational expectations equilibria. Decomposition of the compound 
security into state contingent, "Arrow-Debreu" securities solves the 
problem. Under conditions of a single compound security, market prices do 
not necessarily reveal the state. However, if the compound security is 
decomposed into equivalent Arrow-Debreu securities the state is revealed 
almost instantaneously. The problem of state revelation with a single 
compound security can also be solved if adequate preference information
about agents in the economy is publicly available, and if the agents have 
adequate experience. The process of revelation is slow as experience is 
accumulated. Whereas, if the state contingent commodities are used, the 
system moves to efficiency almost immediately. Since the state contingent 
securities are similar to options, the result leads to a renewed interest in the 
functions of options in financial markets. 
N CONCLUDING REMARKS
The general thesis of this paper is that rationality can be understood as a 
process of discovery, the discovered preference hypothesis. Behavior seems 
to go through stages of rationality that begin with a type of myopia when 
faced with unfamiliar tasks. With incentives and practice, which take the 
form of repeated decisions in the experimental work, (but might include 
play, banter, discussions with others, stages of commitment, etc.) the 
myopia gives way to what appears to be a stage of more considered choices
that reflect stable attitudes or preference (as opposed to the labile attitudes 
identified by psychologists) . Social institutions are seen as playing an 
important role in the attainment of a third stage at which individual decisions 
might incorporate the rationality of others, or the lack of it. 
The dialog that has been taking place in the literature has involved a search 
for a manifestation in markets of the effects of preference !ability that 
psychologists have identified in the study of individual choices. In Sections 
I and II several such effects were identified. Even the behavior of the double 
auction market process contains elements of the effects of idiosyncratic 
features of individual choices. The livatat phenomena does effect the
market. However, these labile aspects of choice seem to yield to another 
mode of behavior and suggest that the lability is due more to perception and 
28 
information processing, as opposed to some fundamental aspect of the way 
that cognition works. 
The final stage of rationality can be facilitated by special institutions. But, 
if institutions can play such a role in forming rationality at the market, or at 
the group level, a possibility exists that institutions operating at the level of 
the individual could be important, as well. Perhaps the stability of market 
processes themselves are heavily dependent upon institutions of one sort or 
another. The striking results of Gode and Sunder (1993), who demonstrate 
that markets populated with randomly behaving agents, still contain 
elements of convergence and efficiency. In other words in the context of the
double auction institution, with the supporting institutions of a budget 
constraint and equal access to the market, agents can act with substantial 
arbitrariness and the process will still maintain power to exhaust much of the 
gains from trade. For some purposes, the minimal addition of institutional 
constraint might be adequate to foster acceptable economic and political 
behavior, even in the absence of the full rationality contained in models of 
such processes. 
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1st 30 seconds 
Total Volmne 
6. l O Volmne 
Period 
Total Volmne 
6. lO Volmne 
Table 1 
Units Traded by Period by Segment of Period 
Select Individuals 
Period 
1 2 3 4 s 6 
5 8 9 6 8 10 
4 5 4 2 4 5 
22 19 21 21 22 20 








Decisions in Centipede Game 
S Amounu of Money .40 .80 1 .60 3.20 6.40 12.80 2S.60 
. JO .20 .40 .80 1 .60 3.20 6.40 
Choosing Individual 2 2 2 
Trials J-5 
;; of People Choosing 145 145 137 1 12 64 16 4 
Number of Tenninatians 0 8 :ZS 48 48 12 
Probability of Tc:nninalion 0 .06 .18 .43 .15 .81 
Trials 6-10 
;; of People Choosing 136 134 124 93 33 10 
;; of Tenrunations 2 10 3 1  60 23 9 
Probability of Temunation .01 .07 .2S .65 .70 .90 
Source: Richard 0. Mc:Kc.ivey and Tbomu � 
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